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-- AnnaSherratt - 05 Nov 2004

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Schedule

Abstracts

More problems for metaphysical nihilism (Geraldine Coggins, Keele)

Metaphysical nihilism is the claim that there could have been no concrete objects, or that there is an empty possible world. Some people think that worlds could be sets and that this view of worlds is compatible with metaphysical nihilsm. This may be motivated by the idea that there is an empty set, therefore there must be an empty world. In the first part of this paper I argue, in principle against this view of worlds (except in a limited case). I then consider a recent attempt to make a set-theoretic account of worlds compatible with metaphysical nihilism. I argue that this recent attempt is metaphysically unsatisfactory and also ontologically ‘very expensive’.

Iterated Modalities and A Priori Modal Knowledge (Dominic Gregorty, Sheffield)

Principles featuring iterated modalities have played an important role in the historical development of recent thought about possibility and necessity, yet they have been peripheral to recent debates over modality. The paper tried to illuminate the question when modal operators can be repeatedly applied by examining various principles relating modal claims to what we may know a priori. It identified one especially promising thesis which entails that, for instance, modal operators can freely be iterated within arithmetical contexts

Theories of modality, metaphysical nihilism and methodology in modal metaphysics (David Efird and Tom Stoneham, University of York)

‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ is a perennial question of metaphysics, if not the fundamental question as Heidegger maintains. Traditionally, the subject matter of this question is taken to be concrete objects, so the question becomes: why is there something concrete rather than nothing concrete? Surprisingly, this question often receives a trivialising answer: ‘Because there had to be something concrete’, some are inclined to answer. This rather incredible answer has ascended to the ranks of respectability amongst contemporary analytic philosophers. But rather than merely labelling it as incredible, Tom Baldwin has recently made precise a way of arguing against it, a way founded on the intuitions (i) that there might have been a finite number of concrete objects, and (ii) that if there is some finite number of concrete objects, there might have been fewer of those concrete objects (and no other such objects). Formalised properly, these intuitions entail that there might have been nothing concrete, a view that has come to be known as ‘metaphysical nihilism’. But metaphysical nihilism, it has been argued, is inconsistent with some of the leading theories of modality. In this paper, we examine one such theory, namely, Armstrong’s combinatorialism, and its putative inconsistency with metaphysical nihilism. This examination will provide an opportunity for a more general investigation than one merely concerned with the consistency of two prominent metaphysical theses; this more general investigation concerns the methodological principles that govern any metaphysical enquiry. So conceived, the present examination becomes one instance of an investigation into the epistemology of metaphysics.

IBE, GMR, and Metaphysical Projects (Scott Shalkowski, Leeds)

Abstract: David Lewis defends Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) by way of an inference to the best explanation (IBE); reasons of theoretical utility are taken as markers of truth. Even if we grant that there are no non-circular grounds for justifying inductive inference as a whole, we still can, and do, give reasons for thinking that some inductive inference forms are reliable under suitable conditions over various domains. An inductive basis for thinking that IBE is reliable depends on the availability of access to the relevant truths of the matters that is independent of the various uses of IBE. Otherwise there are no grounds for maintaining we have been reliable in using IBE over any given domain. Domains permitting no such independent access are domains over which we can have no confidence that instances of IBE are reliable. Genuine Modal Realism concerns one such domain. The wider implication is that IBE should not be granted as a reliable means of adjudicating metaphysical disputes at all.

Report on workshop

The third Modality Workshop took place on the third and fourth of December, 2004. Our invited speakers were Dr Geraldine Coggins from the University of Keele, Dr David Efird from the University of York, Dr Dominic Gregory from the University of Sheffield and Dr Scott Shalkowski from the University of Leeds. Both Geraldine and David spoke about the topic of metaphysical nihilism, which lent some pleasing unity to the workshop. Geraldine talked about “More Problems for Metaphysical Nihilism”, while David presented a paper jointly written with Ton Stoneham, entitled “Theories of Modality, Metaphysical Nihilism and Methodology in Modal Metaphysics”. Scott also dwelt on issues of methodology with his paper “GMR, IBE and Metaphysical Projects” while Dominic spoke about “Iterated Modalities and A Priori Modal Knowledge”.

The workshop was well attended by local philosophers. These included Elizabeth Barnes, Eline Busck, Ross Cameron, Marco Dees, Philip Ebert, Rasmus Johnsen, Dr. Andrew Jorgenson, Dr. Carrie Jenkins, Dr. Dan Lopez de Sa, Dr. Daniel Nolan, Dr. Anna Sherratt, Professor Crispin Wright and Elia Zardini. As the director of the modality project, Professor Bob Hale joined us from the University of Glasgow; also present was Sonia Roca,who is visiting from the University of Barcelona. A rather disappointing aspect of this workshop was the absence of non-local network members; we hope to ensure a better turnout in future. At any rate, the absence of network members was not too keenly felt, due to the very enthusiastic participation of the local philosophers.

Papers available in advance

Attachment	Action	Size	Date	Who	Comment
04.doc	manage	74.0 K	14 Dec 2004 - 15:16	AnnaSherratt	Dominic Gregory's paper
IBE_GMR.doc	manage	83.0 K	14 Dec 2004 - 15:17	AnnaSherratt	Scott Shalkowski's paper

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